

Artificial Intelligence Evolution in the Selected Novel of Philip K. Dick

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Abstract

Philip K. Dick's writing depicts a dystopian society where people are oppressed, rise of capitalism, mind control, altered states of consciousness and existence, alternate histories and artificial intelligence. He portrays a rich source of insight into the nature of contemporary world and man's collective visions of future as well as the impact technology has had on man ways of existing. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? follows the story Rick Deckard whose life wholly depends on the job to find the difference between human and androids. The present paper is an attempt to analyse the transformation made by human and its consequence, when the evolution goes out the control.

Keywords: *Androids, human, creatures, environment*

Literature empowers man to escape out of the pretend presence of regular daily existence and to fail to remember for some time the horrid real factors of life. It gets ready man to confront the chances of life merrily and with fearlessness. With the quick improvement of science and innovation, it has gotten well known in the cutting edge ages. It manages the contentions that emerge out of the effect of logical disclosures on the future existence of mankind. It can inoculate against obliviousness, untimely progression or research, and the depersonalizing danger of mechanical change. In this manner sci-fi is the writing that celebrates not simply science and innovation yet innovation driven social change as perpetual transformation as the last and most inflexible adversary of all fixed force relationships all over the place. The most remarkable sci-fi figures out how to move past predictions of future mechanical change. Theoretical innovation, time travel, outsider races, shrewd robots, quality designing, space travel, test medication, psionic capacities, dimensional entryways or logical standards adds to the plot or foundation.

Science fiction arrived at its height top during the Golden Age. It is described by hard science fiction stories celebrating logical accomplishments and progress. Philip K. Dick, an American, is a famous writer. He is one of the most noticeable author of American science fiction. He has delivered one hundred one short stories and forty-four novels. The novels and short stories of Philip K. Dick are

tales about individuals who end up in abusive, authoritarian societies, in which they are constrained into the battle for concrete, significant character. Dick's most acclaimed novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric sheep?* is one such novel in which the hero winds up enmeshed in a social arrangement of media and ordinary connection with advancements both virtual and physical. This novel proposes an idealistic perspective on another, integrative relationship with innovation that is other than an uneven, subject-object argument, in which the significance of the body data of subjectivity is pushed. The chance of this new relationship with innovation is just acknowledged once the hero of the novel is helped to remember the centrality of the body in his consciousness of sexual craving towards an android, a mechanical propagation of a human.

The novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* investigates that the androids start to glitch or at the end of the day when the androids start acting externally the traditional desires as filling a human need. The androids start to think and want for themselves, rather than doing what they were customized to do, by people. They end up being fit for feeling extremely profound feelings like love and sympathy, which was believed to be an absolutely human sensation; when Rachael Rosen finds that Pris Stratton is a similar model as her, she reveals to Rick that she feels compassion for her. The difficulty for the political request that sustains the customary origination of mankind for this situation, is that

the androids are infringing on an area that was recently thought to be solely human. Since an android is an endeavored replication of a human, and specifically replication of a human psyche, an android's most significant component is its brain. The androids cannot just feel. They cannot exist in an express that isn't here and there profoundly reliant on the tasks of the brain. It very well may be contended that neither can people, yet human usefulness lays on an equilibrium of emotions and musings, and a large portion of all, the unreasonable.

The human limit with regards to irrational and unpredictability is past any intelligent arrangement, by its very nature. It is incomprehensible for androids (in their present status) to get a handle on the nonsensical, or if nothing else acknowledge it. For them, usefulness depends on unadulterated rationale and computations. It is currently evident why compassion has come to be considered as the most crucial limit in people in the novel, that which probably isolates simply natural instances of people from absolutely thinking machines. Eymathy is one indication of the muddled combinations of sentiments and silly conduct in people. Androids essentially don't comprehend, thus they cannot converge with the eymathy box. The absence of empathic comprehension towards other living animals however, is something that actually separates people from androids. The androids are totally incapable to feel any regret at the murdering of the insect, and they positively don't show any sympathy toward any living animal other than individual androids. This is by all accounts a matter of starting point people, who have developed from a creature birthplace, feel the requirement for an empathic relationship with individual organic animals. Yet, since androids didn't advance from creatures similarly that people did, compassion professionally animal with an alternate physiological cosmetics is an outsider idea. However as the novel shows, the action of thinking about creatures is to a great extent shallow, recommending that it is just the declaration of a need to keep up a type of association with the creature's inception. Something else, the substantial, creature root is failed to remember, and people have one less contrast to androids.

Technology present in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* is like enframing is an attitude that is basically a

method of considering the to be world as people need to see it. For instance, to take a gander at a woods and see it through an instrumental and anthropological focal point is to consider it to be a sure measure of number. Technology turns into the methods by which people collaborate with the common world to assemble and arrange assets in to 'standing-reserve', which is actually what it seems like: separating assets and putting away them so they might be utilized later for fuel for different mechanical cycles. Human become an asset for work, and a method by which the closures of technology might be advanced and propagated. Human are expected to work machines and to create fresher, more profitable, and more productive advances. With contexts to the novel, people have made a work innovation, which is in a way a substitution of human work. This 'enframing', 'standing-reserve' mindset is found in the essential employments of the android: "to perform manual labour in the harsh Martin climate, and to make colonists' lives on Mars easier. Even Rachael Rosen, the Rosen Association's public relations android, tells Deckard that her purpose is to observe the last surviving renegade Nexus-6 types in order for the company to learn from the model's downfalls and make a newer model that is even harder to differentiate from humans" (569). In addition to the fact that she performs this job, yet she additionally serves to show how convincingly human the Nexus-6 sorts really are. So unmistakably her motivation is simply instrumental: she is a bit of technology utilized by human to accomplish an end.

Like Jose Ortega Y Gasset's idea about machines being made for a particular reason, the androids are constructed explicitly to act human. The reason for android creation is by all accounts an instrumental one, to make colonist's lives simpler on Mars severally: as companions, and as workers. Aside from the companion models of the androids, the Rosen Association might have effectively not made machines after a picture of humankind and rather assembled hard work machines. However, obviously, the Rosen Association's strength in android development so they would not form large equipment. However, the fact of the matter is that these machines have no characteristic necessity to look convincingly human. It appears to be a perilous bet to make actually great (and definitely better than most people) machines with human personalities,

given the human propensity to dissident or express discontent. People are known to communicate their discontent and disappointment; for what reason should androids not express theirs? Most people would not be happy with hard working, escalated work in risky environment, so then it is without a doubt that an android would not be, by the same token. However obviously they must be or face the outcomes.

Androids build up the craving to be more than 'quantifiable labour' or a 'commodity,' getting mindful of the central closeness between their own development of subjectivity, and that of people. The convoluted cycle of reification in the novel is confirmed in the language utilized by Rick and the other Bounty Hunters, in which they allude to the androids as "it," as an article. However Rick's longing for Racheal Rosen convolutes this reification when he has sexual intercourse with her. As Attaway proposes,

Deckard's intimate encounter[with] Racheal not only complicates his understanding of the androids, but it inspires a traditional kind of romantic love[.] when Racheal explains that this was not the first time she had been with a bounty hunter, Deckard becomes a jealous lover[.] [His] struggle to consider Racheal as an inanimate object is revealed in the language used to describe her response: "She- or rather- it nodded...". (7)

The muddled combination of human-ness and object-ness showed here takes into consideration the 'enframing'demeanor to be applied to the androids: basically, they were in every case inseparably attached to the idea of enframing and instrumentality, as they are basically a bit of technology made and utilized as a methods by people for their own closures. In *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, the androids that are to be resigned are viewed as outdated, not just a danger to human. The got away from androids can be named such an infection in the product androids, in the brains of Earth's specialists, however this longing for a superior life in the androids is proof of a movement towards a more human-like method of being on the planet. Dick himself states, in "The Androids and the Humans", that androids "are, in many deep ways, actually human already... they merely follow lines we follow, in order that they, too, may overcome... common problems" (185). Dick is bringing up the essential comparability among androids and human in

their ability to defeat issues. The prompt issue that the androids are confronting is an emergency of personality, and a craving to be treated as they believe they appropriately merit, as a generally social creature.

This novel shows the two restricting ideas are brought to the point of awkward contact. It would be hard for anybody to acknowledge that an android has gotten human absolutely based on it having found an elective strategy; there more likely than not been some limit with regards to critical thinking that was modified into the androids. Maybe it was that part of human action that Dick might want to think separates human from the machines: man capriciousness. It is surely conceivable that a little component of eccentricism emerged from the calculations that establish the programming in the android's cerebrums. Emanant examples of conduct are surely not an unfamiliar idea to programming; truth be told, Samuel Butler indicates the chance of developing cognizance in machines in his "Book of the Machines" sections of *Erewhon*:

Consciousness, in anything like the present acceptation of the term, having been once a new thing- a thing, as far as we can see, subsequent even to an individual centre of action and to a reproductive system (which we see exiting in plants without apparent consciousness) – why may not there arises some new phase of mind which shall be as different from all present known forms of consciousness as the consciousness of animals from that of vegetables? It would be absurd to attempt to define such a mental state (or whatever it may be called), inasmuch as it must be something so foreign to man that his experience can give him no help towards conceiving its nature; but surely when we reflect upon the manifold phases of life and consciousness which have been evolved already, it would be a rash thing to say that no others can be developed, and that animals life is the end of all thing. (182)

This new awareness isn't so extraordinary all things considered: if the human brain can be disconnected into instructive examples, this infers that it very well may be determined consequently. So the new mechanical awareness in androids is perhaps not all that unique in relation to man; it is designed according to man's own cognizance, it is a simulacrum type of awareness.

The story investigates that the selectiveness of androids and human must be rethought. The two creatures are not all that unique in relation to each other, indeed, they are a lot of the equivalent from various perspectives. The two of them feel feelings, they are both scholarly creatures, they are in any event outwardly pretty much actually indistinguishable (the androids are, maybe, more completely shaped human copies), and they have similar longing for opportunity and the rights to carry on with a day to day existence full of importance and satisfaction. In one case the human hero Rick is blamed for being an android and the way that androids can surely stay tucked away among people (at any rate for quite a while), shows exactly how convincingly comparable they are to people. It appears as though the main explanation their endeavors to acclimatize themselves into human culture have fizzled, is on the grounds that they have been accounted for missing. In the event that they were not announced missing, they could never be recognized as androids. There would be nothing to part with their android nature shy of uncontrollable issues at hand, for example, a specific reality of their conduct that is especially 'inhuman'. However plainly the androids are acting more 'human' than planned, and the people are turning out to be 'androidized.' The key point is, however, that as convincingly human as the androids may act, it is absolutely a demonstration of mimicry.

According to Dick, "in a very real sense our environment is becoming alive, or at least quasi-alive and in ways specifically and fundamentally analogous to ourselves" (The Android and the Human 183). On the off chance that the environment is turning out to be increasingly vivified, the independent predominance of people among energize creatures are undermined, and

they are compelled to re-evaluate originations of themselves in one more sense, as something unmistakable and separate from the outer world. The point, however, is that man-made environment, for example, structures and urban communities are generally lifeless. Before people lived in houses and encircle themselves with lifeless developments, they lived in the wild, completely drenched in a universe of animated presence. So then it is coherent that the environments people work around them should one day come to look like those environs that the human holds back lived in. Maybe it is the mechanical inanimate environment that people have built that has broiler ascend to the mechanical and unsurprising conduct. However, the case remains that in spite of the fact that man has encircle themselves with lifeless developments, they are starting to take on a more independent activity. In the novel, these self-governing machines take two structures: the android and mechanical creatures.

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